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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Afghan/Pakistan frontier dispute is one of the 
most difficult and long-standing problems to face the 
international diplomatic and security community. The 
frontier diving Afghanistan and Pakistan, (commonly known 
as the “Durand Line” after the British Foreign Secretary of 
India, Sir Mortimer Durand, who negotiated the creation of 
the frontier with Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan, in 
1893) has been a scene of tension and instability in the region 
since the time of British imperial rule in the 19th century. 
Before Indian Independence in 1947 the frontier suffered a 
series of violations at the hands of both sides. After 1947, 
Afghanistan declared that it would not recognize the validity 
of the line, a position which led to further stand-offs and 
armed conflicts between Afghanistan and the new state of 
Pakistan. The difficultly of governing the regions around the 
frontier and the lack of Afghan-Pakistan co-operation over 
the frontier (a result of the 1893 frontier settlement) was 
instrumental in incubating the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, 
the rise of the Taliban, and the continuing armed 
insurrections which have faced both Afghanistan and 
Pakistan since 2001. The failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
to come to an agreement over the legal status of the frontier 
has also been blamed for allowing the frontier regions to 
harbor international terrorist groups, not to mention 
hindering economic and social development in the regions 
and the maintenance of basic human rights and the rule of 
law.1    
                                                 
 
 
1 See Bijan Omrani, The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-
Pakistan Border, 40 J. OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y FOR ASIAN AFF., 177-195, (2009) 
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This article will attempt to analyze the merits of the 
competing claims of Afghanistan and Pakistan over the legal 
status of the Durand Line and frontier territories. It will also 
comment on what role a resolution of the legal dispute over 
the frontier might play in a wider settlement of the long-
running problems of the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier. 
 
I. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The difficult geography of the region surrounding the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier [see map] made the area a 
scene of conflict between competing powers long before the 
development of any of the modern states. Historically, the 
region of Afghanistan has been a frontier territory situated 
between three competing centers of power – India, Persia 
(Iran) and Central Asia. Empires based in these regions 
extended their control into the region of Afghanistan and 
pushed their frontiers back and forth there depending on the 
waxing and waning of their relative strength. No stable 
frontier ever crystallized between these three centers of 
power because the geographical features available were never 
sufficient to act as concrete lines of defense.  
 
                                                 
 
 
(where author has previously covered some historical and current affairs 
aspects of the question); See also Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, 
Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of International Law: The Unending 
Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (2010) 
(discussing the problematic development and effects of international law 
over the history of the frontier). 
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This tendency is most clearly seen in the question of 
where the north-western frontier of India should be placed. 
The question was always on the mind of Indian rulers as India 
suffered frequent invasions from the north-west (the only 
viable land route for a hostile army to enter India). Geography 
offers five possible options for a frontier, starting from the 
furthest north [see map]:  
 
i. The River Oxus (Amu-Darya); 
ii. The Hindu Kush mountain range, from the 
Pamir Mountains down to Herat or the deserts 
in the south of Afghanistan; 
iii. The heights of the Suleiman-koh mountain 
range; 
iv. The base of the foothills of the Suleiman-koh 
mountain range; 
v. The Indus River. 
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Over the past 500 years, each of these options have 
served as the north-western frontier of India. The Mughal 
empire briefly attained the Oxus in the 16th century but then 
reverted to the Hindu Kush. After the emergence of the first 
incarnation of the Afghan state in 1747 – the Durrani Empire 
– the frontiers were for a time pushed back as far as Kashmir. 
By the beginning of the 1800s, when the Durrani Empire had 
fallen into decline, the Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab controlled 
much of the territory between the Indus River and the 
Suleiman-koh foothills.2  
The Sikh Kingdom of the Punjab fell into British hands 
after the end of the Second Anglo-Sikh War in 1849, and the 
growing British Empire in India by then extended up to the 
base of Suleiman-Koh foothills, but not into the mountainous 
areas.3  
The British in India after this point faced two geo-
political problems. The first was whether to maintain the 
frontier at that point, or whether to push it further north and 
west for the defense of the Empire. The activities of the 
Russian Empire at that period were causing concern to the 
British. Russian power was growing in Central Asia, and 
British officials feared that Russia in time would push its 
territorial control southwards far enough to threaten British 
India. These fears had originally led the British to attempt to 
put a puppet king on the throne in Kabul during the first 
Anglo-Afghan War (1839-42), an incident which ended in 
failure for the British. British concern mounted throughout 
the 19th century as Russia continued its advance through 
                                                 
 
 
2 See PERCY SYKES, A History of Afghanistan at 351-391 (1940). 
3 See generally AMARPAL SINGH, The Second Anglo-Sikh War, AMBERLEY, 
(2016). 
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Central Asia, annexing large tracts of territory and the cities 
of Tashkent (1869), Samarkand (1868), Bokhara (1869) and 
Khiva (1878).4 
The second problem faced by the British was the 
question of policing. Broadly speaking, the region of southern 
Afghanistan and the Suleiman-koh Mountains and then to a 
certain extent the regions east of the Suleiman-koh foothills 
were (and still are) inhabited by the Pashtun tribal group. The 
Pashtuns were a fissiparous grouping, divided into clans, 
sub-clans and smaller units down to family groupings. The 
way of life and level of economic development of the 
Pashtuns at that time varied widely depending on the 
geography of their immediate habitat. Some, particularly 
those living around Kandahar were urbanized or involved in 
sedentary agriculture. Some were able to prosper as nomadic 
pastoralists who also oversaw the logistics of long-distance 
caravan trade. Others, particularly those without access to 
urban centers or scarce agricultural or grazing land, were 
particularly poor.5  
This was especially the case for the Pashtun hill tribes 
living in the Suleiman-koh mountains. They were reliant on a 
combination of subsidies from outsiders – usually the Afghan 
government in Kabul – and raiding the more prosperous 
settled districts in the neighboring plains to make a living. The 
Pashtun Hill tribes by custom were extremely independent-
                                                 
 
 
4 See MARTIN EWANS, Afghanistan: A Short History of its People and Politics, 
at 59-97, Harper Perennial, London, (2002). 
5 See generally James W. Spain, The Pathan Borderland, THE HAGUE: MOUTON 
& CO., (1963); see also Leon B. Poullada, ‘Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic 
Politics and Relations with Pakistan’, in A. T. Embree , Pakistan’s Western 
Borderlands, at 131, NEW DELHI (1971). 
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spirited and egalitarian in their way of life and customs. They 
were unwilling to follow the laws and edicts of governments 
in the settled districts, whether India or Kabul, and 
maintained their own tribal customs, known as Pashtunwali 
(‘The Way of the Pashtun’) as a form of unwritten common 
law. Conspicuous parts of Pashtunwali included the 
obligation to pursue vendettas in return for injuries or insults 
against oneself or one’s tribal grouping. It also included an 
absolute obligation to provide hospitality even for enemies or 
fugitives from justice in the settled regions. As such, the 
different hill tribes were frequently in conflict with each other, 
but on top of this their pursuit of such laws made it almost 
impossible for governments in the settled districts to reduce 
them to obedience.6  
It should be noted that the subsidies from Kabul were 
in reality little more than protection money to keep open the 
trade routes into India; trade caravans were a particular target 
of the Pashtun hill tribes. It was difficult for the Kabul 
government ever to collect taxes from these regions, though 
they would sometimes be able to enlist the help of the tribes 
in support of the Kabul throne in times of difficulty. It should 
also be noted that the Afghan state initially came into being 
in 1747 as an Empire of Pashtuns, led by the Durrani tribal 
grouping based around Kandahar. Thus, even though the 
Pashtun Hill tribes behaved in an independent fashion, the 
Pashtun-led Kabul government maintained a nominal claim 
                                                 
 
 
6 See Abdur Rauf Khan Khattack, Reforms to the Federally Administered Area 
of Pakistan (FATA)-An Unresolved Problem, 48 ASIAN AFF. 529, 529-542 
(2017); See also, W.K. FRASER-TYTLER, AFGHANISTAN: A STUDY OF POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ASIA  181-191 (2nd ed,. Oxford 
Univ. Press 1953) (for additional information of the Pashtun Hill tribes’ 
history and customs). 
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of sovereignty over them, and considered their tribal kinship 
with the to be of considerable importance.7  
The Suleiman-koh range was poorly mapped in the 
19th century and extremely inaccessible. Any external forces 
who entered it, particularly those travelling in small numbers, 
were highly vulnerable. The British perception that the 
Pashtun Hill tribes were dangerous, hostile, difficult to 
govern and reduce to obedience, and bent on predation of the 
settled districts, continued to be one of the prime 
considerations in whether to advance the area deemed to be 
under direct British control further north-west.  
Between 1849 to around the period of the Second Anglo-
Afghan War (1878-1880), the British pursued a ‘close-border’ 
policy. They decided against any attempt to bring the 
Suleiman-koh Mountains and the Pashtun Hill tribes under 
their control or formal sovereignty. Instead, they attempted to 
prevent the hill-tribes raiding the settled districts by building 
fortifications, using locally-raised levies to repel attacks, and 
by paying the tribes subsidies to ensure good behavior: for 
example, to return fugitives, to restrain themselves from 
raiding and to keep the roads open to travelers and trade 
caravans. This approach was not especially successful, and 
the British mounted 23 full-scale expeditions into the territory 
of the Pashtun Hill tribes between 1857-1881 to chastise them 
for raids or other infringements of the peace.8  
Around 1878, the close border policy began to change. 
The British fear of increasing Russian encroachment in 
Central Asia led to the argument that the frontier should be 
                                                 
 
 
7 See e.g. O. CAROE, THE PATHANS XI-XV, at 335-336, MACMILLAN & CO. LTD. 
(1958). 
8 Id. at 348-49. 
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pushed up to the Hindu Kush, to include Kabul and 
Kandahar as frontier cities: the so-called “forward policy”. In 
1878, there was an effective attempt to put this policy into 
practice. The British accused the Afghan King of 
communicating with the Russian government, thus 
endangering the security of India. The following dispute led 
to the Second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880). For a period, 
the British attempted to dismember Afghanistan and retain 
the areas south of the Hindu Kush but this was found to be 
unviable, and the occupation was ended with a return of 
troops and effective control to the base of the Suleiman-koh 
range. However, in the aftermath of the war the British made 
a treaty with the King of Afghanistan to take full control of 
Afghan policy and foreign relations in return for an annual 
subsidy, military assistance and a guarantee of security.  
Despite the failure of the Second Afghan War, there 
were calls for the limit of British control to be pushed into the 
Suleiman-koh Mountains. Some officials argued that there 
should be ‘peaceful penetration’ into the areas of the hill 
tribes. Small areas of the tribal territory should be taken under 
occupation and control and fortified, and that tribesmen 
should be enlisted as members of irregular forces to keep the 
peace. Such employment would, they argued, would lead to 
economic development and greater pacification of the region. 
This policy, known as the ‘Sandeman System’ had been 
pursued with some success in the region of Baluchistan to the 
south-west of the Pashtun territories. It was not formally put 
into practice in the Pashtun regions after 1880, but there was 
greater penetration of the regions during this period. 
Following the Second Afghan War, British forces occupied the 
Khyber Pass. By 1892, the British had established local 
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outposts including the Samana Crest, the Southern Tirah, and 
the Kurram Valley.9  
These British advances, given the uncertainty of how 
far an advance should be made into the tribal regions, gave 
rise to a desire on the part of the British to make a firm 
demarcation of the frontier between British India and 
Afghanistan. This desire was supplemented by a continuing 
fear of a Russian advance on India through the little-explored 
region of the Wakhan and Pamirs. The British aspiration for a 
frontier settlement with Kabul included the objective not only 
of setting a frontier between British India and Afghanistan, 
but also confirming Afghanistan’s own frontier with the 
Russian Empire to the north, a frontier which still had not 
been fully agreed or demarcated.  
In October 1893 the Foreign Secretary of India, Sir 
Mortimer Durand, travelled to Kabul to negotiate these 
matters with Abdur Rahman, the Amir of Afghanistan. The 
negotiations lasted a month, culminating in the signature of 
two separate treaties between the Governments of British 
India and Afghanistan on 12 November 1893, one of which 
dealt with the Indo-Afghan frontier and the other of which 
dealt with the Russo-Afghan frontier.10  
The treaty which dealt with the Indo-Afghan frontier stated 
in its preamble that the intention of the two governments in 
signing it was to fix “the limit of their respective spheres of 
influence, so that for the future there may be no difference of 
opinion on the subject between the allied Governments…”.11 
                                                 
 
 
9 Id. at 378-79. 
10 See SIR PERCY SYKES, A HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN VOL. II, at 173-77 
(1940). 
11 Id. at 353. 
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A map was attached to the treaty with a line (the Durand 
Line) agreed by Durand and the Amir running from “the 
Wakhan to the Persian border”. The treaty provided that “the 
eastern and southern frontier of [the Amir’s] dominions” 
should follow the line shown on the map (article 1). Article 2 
provided that:  
 
The Government of India will at no time 
exercise interference in the territories lying 
beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan, 
and His Highness the Amir will at no time 
exercise interference in the territories lying 
beyond this line on the side of India. 
 
Articles 3 and 5 clarify some of the points of the division of 
territories and districts by the line. Article 4 provided that the 
line would be demarcated on the ground by a joint 
commission of British and Afghan officials, which should do 
its best to follow the line as shown on the map attached to the 
treaty, but that the commission should have “due regard to 
the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier”. 
Article 7 provided for annual financial and military subsidies 
to be paid to the Afghan government in token of their 
goodwill. 
 
Article 6 provided that:  
 
The above articles of agreement are regarded by 
the Government of India and His Highness the 
Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory 
settlement of all the principal differences of 
opinion which have arisen between them in 
regard to the frontier…” 
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In addition, any differences in detail about the line 
should be referred to the boundary commission working on 
the ground.  
The second agreement signed on the same day 
regarding the northern frontier of Afghanistan was 
differently worded, making no mention of spheres of 
influence. It describes its intention as the formation of “the 
northern boundary of Afghanistan”.  
The actual demarcation took place for the most part 
between 1893-1896. Tensions caused by the presence of the 
boundary commission in the hill areas led to a general 
uprising which led to British reprisals in the years following 
1897, known as the Malakand Campaign12. Small sections 
near Chitral and also in the Mohmand territories on the routes 
to Kabul, on account of these difficulties, remained 
undermarketed until the 1920s.  
In 1904, the Punjab, which was the province of India 
which predominantly faced the Afghan frontier was divided 
at the order of the British Viceroy, Lord Curzon. A new 
province made up of the areas closest to the frontier, named 
the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP, recently 
renamed Khyber-Pakhtunkwa) was created. There was a 
return to the close border policy, but in the tribal districts in 
the hills the Frontier Crimes Regulation was promulgated, 
which remains in force today (for further discussion, see 
below). Each of the tribal regions (known as agencies), then 
five in number, were treated as quasi-autonomous but were 
put under the responsibility of a British resident agent who 
                                                 
 
 
12 See generally Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force, 
London (1898). 
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answered directly to the Viceroy. During this period there 
was a low level of practical penetration of the tribal areas, 
thanks to the maintenance of the close border policy. The 
British government stated that they had not assumed 
sovereignty over the Tribal areas beyond the foothills but 
viewed itself in the position of a suzerain power (see below).13  
The 1893 treaty regarding the Durand Line was 
confirmed in a 1905 Anglo-Afghan treaty signed by Abdur 
Rahman’s successor as ruler of Afghanistan, Amir 
Habibullah.  
In 1919, the Amir Habibullah was assassinated and 
was succeeded by the Amir Amanullah. Amanullah, 
motivated by radical elements hostile to the British, launched 
an invasion of British India across the Durand Line. This 
action led to the Third Anglo-Afghan War, which only lasted 
for two months; it was swiftly brought to an end by the first 
use of western air power against Afghanistan14. In the Peace 
Treaty which followed the end of the War, the Treaty of 
Rawalpindi (8 August 1919), it was agreed that “The Afghan 
Government accept the Indo-Afghan frontier accepted by the 
late Amir.” (Article 5). A letter from the British Government 
representative, Sir Hamilton Grant, to the Government of 
Afghanistan following the signing of the Treaty, stated that 
the Third Anglo-Afghan War “cancelled all previous 
treaties”. The 1919 Treaty also returned control of Afghan 
foreign policy to the Afghan government, making 
Afghanistan fully independent in the conduct of its external 
affairs.  
                                                 
 
 
13 See Caroe, supra note 8, at 413-420. 
14 See Sykes, supra note 11, at 270-294. 
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A more extensive treaty to regulate Anglo-Afghan 
relations in the wake of Afghanistan’s independence was 
signed between the two countries in 1921 (the Treaty of Kabul, 
22 November 1921). Article 2 provided that “The two high 
contracting parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier 
as accepted by the Afghan Government under Article V of the 
Treaty concluded on August 8, 1919...”. Also of relevance to 
the frontier was article 11, which provided that each side 
would “inform the other in future of any military operations 
of major importance which may appear necessary for the 
maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing 
within their respective spheres, before the commencement of 
such operations”. It is to be noted that the word “sphere” 
rather than “territory” was used in this treaty.  
The 1921 treaty, unlike those previous to it, provided a 
repudiation clause (article 14):  
 
The provisions of this treaty shall come into 
force from the date of its signature, and shall 
remain in force for three years from that date. In 
case neither of the High Contracting Parties 
should have notified twelve months before the 
expiration of the said three years the intention 
to terminate it, it shall remain binding until 
expiration of one year from the day on which 
either of the High Contracting Parties shall have 
denounced it... 
 
As a rider to the 1921 Treaty, the British Government 
acknowledged in a note to the Government of Afghanistan 
that the “conditions of the frontier tribes of the two 
Governments are of interest to the Government of 
Afghanistan”. However, there was no attempt to define in 
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concrete terms the nature of this interest or how such an 
interest should manifest itself in the rights and obligations of 
either party to the treaty. As such, the interest as mentioned 
in this rider remained inchoate.  
In the 1920s and early 1930s, Afghanistan faced several 
periods of instability, including the overthrow of Amanullah, 
a civil war which saw the brief elevation of a non-Pashtun 
(known as Bacha-i Saqao) to the Afghan throne, and the 
assassination of Bacha-i Saqao’s royal Pashtun successor, 
Nadir Shah. At this time, the Kabul government used its 
influence with the Pashtun tribes on the Indian side of the 
Durand line to enlist their support in the periods of internal 
armed conflict which took place. Agents of the Kabul 
government also agitated amongst the tribes on the Indian 
side of the Durand Line to cause difficulties for the British 
administration in India. The British returned to a forward 
policy in the Pashtun tribal areas on their side of the Durand 
Line with some attempts to increase penetration and 
permanent control. However, these attempts were 
unsuccessful. There were over 200 recorded raids from the 
tribal areas during the 1930s, as well as a full-scale uprising 
led by a charismatic religious leader, the Fakir of Ipi, which 
led to the engagement of 32,000 regular troops from British 
India.15  
In May 1930, an exchange of notes between the Afghan 
Minister in London, His Highness General Shah Wali Khan, 
and the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, 
confirmed that the 1921 Kabul Treaty continued to have full 
force and effect.  
                                                 
 
 
15 Id. at 295-336. 
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In 1944, following the British announcement of 
impending Indian independence, the Afghan government 
wrote to the Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, to request 
discussions on the future of the Pashtun frontier tribes, with 
a view to bringing them back under Afghan control and 
sovereignty. The government of India refused to open 
discussions, stating that Afghanistan should negotiate the 
matter with the successor authority.16   
During the process of Indian partition, the settled parts 
of the NWFP voted in a plebiscite to join Pakistan rather than 
India. The turnout was low on account of a boycott; many 
Pashtuns in the settled district were more sympathetic to the 
Congress party than the Muslim league on account of local 
political conditions. However, an absolute majority of the 
population still voted to join Pakistan. In the tribal territories, 
British officials held jirgas (traditional assemblies) with tribal 
elders in which the frontier hill tribes were only offered the 
option of establishing the same relationship of suzerainty 
with Pakistan as they had previously had with the British 
Crown. A number of these jirgas were only held in the months 
after independence.17  
Afghanistan’s initial reaction to Pakistan’s 
maintenance of the Durand Line and continuing claim of the 
tribal lands on Pakistan’s side was mixed. The first 
ambassador of Afghanistan to Pakistan stated that 
Afghanistan had no claims on the frontier territory, and that 
all claims to the contrary in the Afghan press should be 
                                                 
 
 
16 See generally Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, at 485-499, PRINCETON 
UNIVERSITY PRESS (1973). 
17 Dorothea S. Franck, Disputed Disposition of a Tribal Land, 6 MIDDLE EAST 
J. 49, 49-68 (1952). 
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disregarded. Nevertheless, many Afghan media outlets called 
for the restoration of the Pashtun tribal areas to Afghan 
control, putting forward a vision of a return to a greater 
Afghan empire similar to that which had existed during the 
18th century. Some of these calls put forward the notion of 
“Pashtunistan” – an independent homeland for the Pashtun 
tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line which would 
be kept under Afghan protection.  
The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
quickly deteriorated after 1947. In 1948, Afghanistan voted 
against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations on 
account of its continuing control of the Tribal areas. In 1949, 
following an inadvertent attack by Pakistan on the 
Afghanistan in the Tribal areas, a loya jirga (grand tribal 
council) was convened in Kabul which repudiated all frontier 
treaties and gave support to the notion of Pashtunistan. It 
made a formal call for a plebiscite in the frontier areas on the 
now-Pakistani side to offer Pashtun the Pashtun tribes the 
opportunity of joining a new entity of Pashtunistan.  
Pakistan and Afghanistan both made a number of 
incursions or staged interference across the Durand Line over 
the following years. In 1949, Pakistan made an accidental 
incursion across the Durand Line at Moughlai, one-and-a-half 
miles into Afghan territory. Shortly afterwards, on 12 August 
1949, groups of Pashtuns met on the Pakistan side of the line 
at Tirah Bagh and Razmak to establish a Pashtunistan 
assembly. In 1950 and 1951, there were incursions led by large 
columns of irregular Afghan forces principally composed of 
Pashtun tribesmen and under the leadership of Pashtun chiefs 
across the Durand Line with the avowed intention of planting 
a Pashtunistan flag on the Indus River. The Government of 
Afghanistan denied any connection with the incursions, and 
stated that they were freedom fighters. Pakistan retaliated by 
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preventing or slowing imports across the line. In 1960, the 
Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Sardar Mohammed Daoud 
Khan, ordered several thousand troops dressed as tribesmen 
to cross the Durand Line into the Tribal Agency of Bajaur on 
the Pakistan side of the line, but the column was repelled by 
the Bajauris. There were two further Afghan incursions in 
1961, and Pashtuns on the Pakistan side were encouraged and 
armed by Afghans to launch attacks on Pakistani military 
units and blow up bridges.18  
In 1950, the British Foreign Secretary stated in the 
House of Commons that it was the official view of the British 
Government that the Durand Line was the boundary 
demarcating the sovereign territories of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.19  
In 1955, the Establishment of West Pakistan Act was passed 
to unify all the provinces which then made up West Pakistan 
(it should be remembered that Bangladesh was then part of 
Pakistan, known as “East Pakistan”). Under the Act, 2 (iv), the 
Tribal Territories were formally integrated into West 
Pakistan. Under Article 1(2) of the new 1956 Constitution of 
Pakistan, which replaced the Government of India Act 1935 
as the constitutional framework for Pakistan, all of West 
Pakistan as defined in the West Pakistan Act 1955 was 
declared to be a territory of Pakistan. The constitution makes 
no distinction regarding sovereignty between the Tribal areas 
on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line and any other part 
of Pakistan. The special legal framework for the government 
of the Tribal Territories (The Frontier Crimes Regulation 1901) 
remained in force in the Tribal Territories. The West Pakistan 
                                                 
 
 
18 Dupree, supra note 17, at 538-40. 
19 See Caroe, supra note 8, at 485. 
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Act was rescinded in 1970 and the individual provinces 
reinstated.  
Pakistan maintained the framework of governance for 
the Tribal territories left behind by the British, including the 
hierarchy of Tribal Agents. From independence in 1947 to the 
mid-1970s Pakistan kept its military presence in the Tribal 
regions to a minimum. The Government of Pakistan assumed 
responsibility for the development of the region, although the 
level of development was extremely low (e.g. a $40,000 
budget for the whole of FATA in 1971-2).  
An attempted rapprochement between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in the mid-1970s intended to settle the dispute over 
the Durand Line failed. From 1977, the President of Pakistan, 
Zia ul-Haq, pursued a policy of Islamisation as a 
counterweight to Pashtun nationalism. The Tribal areas were 
used to radicalize and train Islamist fighters in isolation away 
from the public gaze for use in attacking Indian interests in 
Kashmir as well as with the intention of establishing influence 
in Afghanistan. At this period Afghanistan was prey to 
serious instability. Afghanistan suffered a coup in 1973 which 
put an end to the monarchy, followed by a series of extreme 
left-wing coups at the end of the decade which plunged the 
country into chaos and encouraged the Soviet invasion of 
1979. Pakistan harbored Islamist fighters in the Tribal areas 
during this period, intending to use them to repel any attack 
by the USSR, and also to establish Pakistani influence across 
the Durand Line in southern Afghanistan. Pakistan 
developed at this time a doctrine of “strategic depth”, which 
held that in the event of any full-scale military conflict with 
India, southern Afghanistan should be used as a strategic 
hinterland and safe haven, and that Pakistan should project 
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its influence there in order to secure the region for its 
purpose.20  
The use of the Tribal territories by Pakistan for the 
purpose of harboring militants to cross the frontier and 
project influence on behalf of Pakistan continued throughout 
the war between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (1979-
1989) the Afghan Civil War (1989-2001), notably with the 
establishment of the Taliban, a Pakistani proxy intended to 
govern southern Afghanistan, and also in the period 
following the Allied invasion of Afghanistan (2001-date). It 
should be noted that despite its Pakistani backing, the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan refused to give any formal 
recognition to the Durand Line.  
Since 2001, Pakistan has waged a number of offensive 
campaigns in the Tribal territories to attack a number of 
radical Islamic militant groups which spiraled out of control 
of the Pakistani intelligence community which had originally 
cultivated them. The United States also has crossed the 
Durand Line from the Afghan side to launch aerial military 
attacks on militants on the Pakistani side of the line, often 
without the consent or knowledge of the Government of 
Pakistan.21  
Several reports have been made after 2001 of Pakistani 
military forces moving the border pillars of the Durand Line 
demarcation in certain areas and pushing the areas of 
                                                 
 
 
20 See generally Christian Wagner & Amina Khan, The Changing Character of 
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21 See Amit Ranjan, Drone Attacks In Afghanistan And The Af-Pak Region: Is 
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effective control a number of miles into Afghan territory. It is 
difficult to verify these reports independently.22  
In March 2017, Pakistan approved a plan to 
incorporate the Tribal territories fully into the province of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, removing the 1901 Frontier Crimes 
Regulation and putting all inhabitants of the Tribal Territories 
on the same legal-rights footing as other citizens of Pakistan. 
This policy has been denounced by the Government of 
Afghanistan, with a renewed statement that Afghanistan will 
refuse to accept such an incorporation of the Tribal territories 
into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and that Afghanistan still does 
not accept the Durand Line as an international frontier.23  
 
II. 1893: POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONCEPTION OF THE 
DURAND LINE AND FATA 
 
For an analysis of the legal conception of the Durand Line at 
the time of its establishment in the late 19th century, it will be 
useful to start with remarks made on the matter by officials in 
the Government of India. These provide clear guidance on the 
British understanding of the line at this period, and, in 
addition to the black-letter text of the treaties and the 
geographical circumstances, allow the Line to be put in the 
international law context of the period.  
 
Sir Mortimer Durand wrote after the negotiations that:  
 
                                                 
 
 
22 See SARAH CHAYES, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the 
Taliban, at 132, LONDON: PENGUIN, (2006). 
23 See Khattak, supra note 7, at 531-42 (explaining the structure and purpose 
of FCR and the reaction to the reform). 
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[. . .] the tribes on the Indian side are not to be 
considered as within British territory.  They are 
simply under our influence in the technical 
sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the 
Amir is concerned and as far as they submit to 
our influence or we exert it24 
 
Lord Elgin, Viceroy of India, wrote in 1896:  
 
The Durand Line was an agreement to define 
the respective spheres of influence of the British 
Government and of the Amir. Its object was to 
preserve and to obtain the Amir’s acceptance of 
the status quo.25 
 
Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, 
wrote in a Government memorandum on the Durand Line in 
1896 (a document which clearly purports to state the official 
understanding of the Government of India):  
 
I think it is of the highest importance that it 
should simply be understood to be a line on 
our side of which the Amir’s [Abdur 
Rahman] interference except when we allow 
him to chastise a tribe, shall be absolutely 
excluded[. . .].I think if the agreement 
                                                 
 
 
24 G.W. Leitner, The Amir, the Frontier Tribes, and the Sultan, 4 IMPERIAL AND 
ASIATIC Q. REV. AND ORIENTAL AND COLONIAL REC. 237 (1897) (Eng.). 
25 Letter from Elgin, Priv. and Secret letter and enclosures received from 
India, to Hamilton, 85 (1896) (on file with the Asia, Pac., and Afr. 
Collections at the Brit. Libr.). 
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between us and the Amir were treated to be 
anything like a partition of territory, it 
would have a bad effect, and although I see 
it must practically involve something like a 
partition of... the ‘Sphere of influence’ I think 
it would be unwise to put it expressly that 
way [. . .] 26 
 
He went on to state that the intention of the British in 
establishing the frontier was not to annex new territory or 
increase the physical extent of British sovereignty, but to 
“obviate the need for necessity for effective occupation as a 
bar to annexation or encroachment by a competing state.” 
Furthermore, the Government wished to avoid the 
appearance of a partition of territory since it might “at some 
points of the line, cast on us obligations of a very onerous 
nature without any commensurate advantage; and 2nd, 
because it might alarm the tribes and set them against us.” 
The Tribal Areas, beyond the boundary of the settled districts, 
was to be regarded as nothing more than a “possible 
protectorate”. This area might, in the fullness of time, become 
an area over which the British held full sovereignty, but this 
would only be possible when “full and close control” could 
be exercised by the Government of India over the whole 
territory all the way up to the Indian side of the Line. 
In 1907, Lord Curzon, who served as Viceroy of India 
from 1899-1905, described the north-western frontier of India 
as a “three-fold frontier” which comprised of:  
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i. “The administrative border of British India”, i.e. the 
boundary between the settled districts of the plains 
and the tribal districts of the foothills. Up to this 
boundary on the settled side the ordinary laws of 
British India were in force; 
ii. “The Durand Line, or frontier of active protection”;  
iii. “The Afghan Border [i.e. the northern border of 
Afghanistan on the River Oxus] which is the outer 
or advanced strategical frontier”.27  
Taking these descriptions altogether, the following 
characteristics can be attributed to the Line in the official 
British understanding of it in the 1890s:  
i. The Durand Line was intended to demarcate the 
spheres of influence of Afghanistan and British 
India in the Pashtun tribal hill territories. It was not 
such an arrangement as to go so far as being a 
protectorate;  
ii. The Tribal hill territories themselves on the Indian 
side of the line (FATA) were not seen as part of 
British sovereign territory. These territories were 
not governed by the normal laws of British India. 
The British government exercised a suzerainty over 
them by direct arrangements between the tribal 
chiefs and the British Crown;  
iii. The British government had it in mind that they 
might advance claims for sovereignty of the Tribal 
                                                 
 
 
27 George Nathanial Curzon, Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Address at the 
Romanes Lecture, (Nov. 2, 1907) in Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907, at 41. 
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hill territories in time, but only when they were in 
a position to control the area more fully;  
This treatment of the Durand Line was consistent with 
the contemporary trends of International Law regarding the 
acquisition of territory. The notion of ‘spheres of influence’ 
can be traced back to agreements between Spain and Portugal 
in the 15th century for the pursuit of colonizing activity in 
Africa, but it found its modern definition and came into 
vogue with the agreement between Great Britain and 
Germany in May 1885 for defining the parties’ relative 
‘spheres of action’. A number of agreements to delimit 
spheres of influence in the race to acquire new colonial 
territories were made between various powers following the 
1885 agreement. The international jurist M.F. Lindley, writing 
in 1926, divides these arrangements into four categories, of 
which the Durand Agreement falls most comfortably into the 
first, ‘Spheres of influence over large unorganized areas by 
agreements between colonial powers’.28 Although the third 
category, ‘Spheres of Influence in the Territory of a single 
State by direct agreement with its Sovereign’ might at first 
sight seem more appropriate, the first is preferable in this 
instance as the substance of the latter category appears to 
have been an agreement not to alienate the territory in the 
sphere of influence to any other party except the contracting 
party; the 1893 agreement was about the exercise of influence. 
Moreover, although Afghanistan maintained a claim of 
sovereignty over the entire tribal hill territory, this was not 
recognized by the British. The Afghan claim to sovereignty of 
                                                 
 
 
28 M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in 
International Law, at 208, LONGMANS, GREENE & CO., LTD. (1969). 
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the region had been weakened by the failure of the 
government of Kabul to express any practical control or 
exercise any of the functions of government in the Tribal hill 
territories for a number of decades before 1893. Indeed, 
sections of the hill territories had been conquered by the Sikh 
Kingdom of the Punjab under Maharajah Ranjit Singh after 
the 1820s and had been under Sikh administration until the 
end of the Sikh Kingdom in 1849. Afghanistan, as a sovereign 
power (though itself after 1880 under the protection of Britain 
as regards its foreign policy), was therefore for all practical 
purposes in the position of a colonial power attempting to 
establish control of contiguous territories.  
The obligations on the parties under such agreements 
for the delimitation of spheres of influence, according to 
Lindley, were not onerous.29 Each party was obliged not to 
interfere “where it has promised to leave the other a free 
hand. The obligation is to abstain from political action which 
might be regarded as a step towards the acquisition of 
sovereignty.” Such agreements did not preclude either party 
establishing commercial or trading interests in the other 
party’s sphere. The agreement had no binding force on any 
third power outside the affected area. The rights of native 
sovereigns within the spheres of influence were not affected. 
Any attempt by one of the parties to increase its power within 
its sphere could be made by agreements with the native 
sovereigns. The party could acquire legal title over the area of 
influence by such agreements and the assumption of duties of 
administration. In this way, states Lindley, “the shadowy 
privileges pertaining to a sphere of influence have been 
transformed into a title which is valid by International Law”.  
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The black-letter text of the 1893 Durand treaty appears 
to be thoroughly in accord with the contemporary 
international law practice as described by Lindley, and 
written with the other many recent agreements for the 
delimitation of spheres of influence in mind. As such, it seems 
safe to conclude that this was the intention certainly of the 
British in signing the 1893 treaty, and the treaty should be 
understood as one providing for the delimitation of spheres 
of influence.  
As there was no substantive change in the British practice of 
administering FATA between the 1893 Treaty and Indian 
independence in 1947, it is submitted that the inchoate 
possibility of British sovereignty over FATA never hardened 
into legal title.  
 
III. POSITION OF PAKISTAN REGARDING THE DURAND LINE 
AND FATA SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The official position of Pakistan regarding the status of 
the Durand Line and FATA is that FATA forms a part of the 
sovereign territory of Afghanistan, and that the Durand Line 
is the international boundary which divides the sovereign 
territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This position is 
expressed in the Constitution of Pakistan.30 
 
IV. POSITION OF AFGHANISTAN REGARDING THE DURAND 
LINE AND FATA, AND THE OBJECTIONS TO THE POSITION 
OF PAKISTAN 
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The official position of Afghanistan regarding the 
Durand Line is that Afghanistan does not recognize the 
Durand Line as an international boundary. Afghanistan’s 
claims regarding the territory of FATA have been various and 
not clearly articulated, but they do not accept that Pakistan 
has a right to possess the territories.31 
The objections which have been or could be made by 
Afghanistan to the position of Pakistan recognizing the 
Durand Line as an international boundary demarcating the 
sovereign territories of Afghanistan and Pakistan are as 
follows:  
 
i. That the original treaties between the Governments 
of India and Afghanistan did not intend a division 
of sovereignty between the two powers;  
ii. That the agreement was capable of repudiation 
under the terms of the 1921 Treaty, and that 
Afghanistan had invoked this clause in 1949;  
iii. That under the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus the 
treaties establishing the Durand Line were 
invalidated by the Independence of India;  
iv. That the state practice of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
over the course of time has prevented the Durand 
Line from acquiring the status of an international 
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boundary demarcating sovereign territories 
(estoppel);  
v. That the tribes on the Pakistan side of the line were 
not given a full right of self-determination by being 
offered the right to join Afghanistan at the time of 
Indian independence in 1947; 
vi. That the 1893 treaty was obtained under duress and 
that it was thereby invalid;  
vii. That the 1893 treaty was not properly ratified by the 
Government of Afghanistan; 
viii. That Pakistan is not a successor state to British 
India, and thus not an inheritor of the rights and 
obligations imposed by earlier treaties made by 
British India.  
 
V. DISCUSSION OF AFGHAN OBJECTIONS  
 
a. INTENTION OF TREATIES  
 
Afghanistan has objected to the position that the 
Durand Line is a sovereign boundary on the grounds that it 
never consented in any of the treaties for the Line to assume 
such a status. Afghanistan contends that the original 1893 
Treaty was not intended to divide sovereignty over the 
region, but was rather to divide spheres of influence. The 
arrangement was not to be viewed as permanently fixed. The 
contrast in language between the 1893 treaties dealing with 
the northern boundaries of Afghanistan and the Durand Line 
(see below) should be viewed as indicative of their different 
natures. Afghanistan also contends that the successive treaties 
and exchanges of letters touching on the matter of the Durand 
Line did not alter the position as regarding the nature of the 
line or indicate any assent on the part of Afghanistan towards 
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the Line developing into an international sovereign 
boundary.  
Afghanistan has a convincing case for claiming that 
there was never any consent for the Durand Line to be an 
international sovereign boundary. However, despite the 
absence of Afghan consent, the circumstances are such that a 
claim by Pakistan on the grounds of effective possession 
could overcome any case by Afghanistan based on an 
argument of entitlement through original lack of consent (see 
below).  
 
b. TREATY CAPABLE OF REPUDIATION 
As stated above, the 1921 Treaty, unlike those before it, 
had a repudiation clause (article 14). This provided for the 
termination of the treaty one year after either party gave 
notice, and that no other conditions were required for the 
clause to be triggered. Afghanistan contends that the 
repudiation clause of the treaty was invoked by the 
declaration of the Loya Jirga in 1949 and hence that under the 
terms of the treaty the repudiation came into effect in 1950.  
Afghanistan would be able to contend that if the nature 
of the Durand Line was that of a sphere of influence rather 
than that which was intended to divide sovereign territories, 
then it would be able to obviate the rule regarding “executed 
clauses”. Treaty clauses which are intended to demarcate 
sovereign boundaries are regarded as having been 
“executed” on the ratification of the treaty. When the division 
of territory has been “executed”, the work of the clauses has 
been completed and they cannot be repudiated or revoked. 
The treaty clauses are equivalent to title deeds in a 
conveyance, which once they have been enacted have no force 
other than to memorialize the transfer of the relevant 
property. In this case, since the treaty did not intend a 
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sovereign boundary to be created, the clauses had not been 
executed but were in fact “executory”. They had a contractual 
force which placed a continuing obligation on the parties, not 
to interfere in the sphere of influence of the other party. As 
such, Afghanistan may contend that the clause was capable of 
extinction on the repudiation of the treaty.32  
However, although Afghanistan may validly be able to 
contend that the 1921 treaty and the clause concerning the 
Durand Line had been repudiated, the response to this 
objection is the same as that to that regarding the original 
intention of the treaties above. A claim by Pakistan based on 
effective possession also overcomes this objection.  
 
VI. REBUS SIC STANTIBUS 
Afghanistan may attempt to rely on the doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus to argue that the sections of the 1921 treaty 
providing for the maintenance of the Durand Line should be 
invalidated on the grounds that the fundamental 
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the treaty – i.e. 
India as one entity under British rule – had come to an end 
with Indian independence in 1947 and the partition of British 
India into the then Dominions of India and Pakistan. It should 
be noted that the dissolution of the direct agreements between 
the Pashtun Chiefs and the British crown at the moment of 
Indian independence also generated a period when the 
Pashtun tribes on the Pakistani side were de jure independent 
and without any allegiance to Pakistan, until they re-
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106 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
established similar connections with the Government of 
Pakistan over the months following Indian independence.33 
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is well recognized in 
international law. It was accepted as an article of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties in 1969, but before that in 
the relevant period, that is 1947, the doctrine was already still 
recognized as valid by international jurists.   
However, at the time of Indian independence, as 
Oppenheim notes “in almost all cases in which the doctrine… 
has been invoked before an international tribunal, the latter, 
while not rejecting it as a principle, has refused to admit that 
it could be applied to the case before it”.34 The bar to 
admitting a claim based on rebus sic stantibus is high on the 
grounds that “it is a function of the law to enforce contracts 
or treaties even if they become burdensome for the party 
bound by them.” Hence, jurists are reluctant to allow rebus sic 
stantibus to be a get-out clause for a treaty obligation which 
has become onerous.   
The use of the doctrine would be complicated since at 
the relevant time, particularly on account of the scarcity of 
international case law, there was no agreed test for invoking 
the doctrine. Rebus sic stantibus was invoked without success 
by the claimant in Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of 
Gex35. The court at various times articulated the doctrine as 
being applicable “when the situations have so changed that 
the reason which caused the rules to be imposed no longer 
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exists”, and later that there had to have been “an essential 
change in the circumstances for which the treaty has been 
concluded”. 
The 1928 supplement to the American Journal of International 
Law offered three alternative approaches to the doctrine. The 
first posits that a treaty continues in force when “a relation 
between the binding force of the treaty and a continuance of 
a state of facts [remains] essentially unchanged because the 
parties intended that the continuance of the state of facts 
should be a condition of the binding force of the treaty”. The 
second looks not to the intention of the parties, but whether 
the changes complained of are “essential”, “fundamental”, or 
“vital”. L.H. Woolsey discussed what could be described as 
vital in these circumstances:  
 
Changes which are regarded by authorities as 
fundamental or vital are those which: take away 
the very foundation of the engagement, that is, 
its raison d'etre; threaten or cause the sacrifice 
of a state's development or its vital 
requirements for political or economic existence 
to the execution of the treaty, that is, make 
performance impracticable except at an 
unreasonable sacrifice; are inconsistent with the 
right of self-preservation, or incompatible with 
the independence of the state; modify 
essentially the political relations which 
produced political treaties, as for example 
treaties of alliance; make a treaty really 
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inapplicable, or actually impossible of 
fulfilment.36 
The third approach would be that the doctrine could 
be invoked it “a change in the state of facts would be so 
injurious to one of the parties that such party has a right under 
the law or right of necessity to terminate the treaty.” 
The high bar to the invocation of the doctrine means that 
regardless of which test would be applicable, it is unlikely 
that Afghanistan could successfully invoke it. As regards the 
first approach, although it is unlikely in 1921 that Indian 
independence and partition would have been envisaged by 
either party, with Independence and partition there had not 
been any essential change in the geographical, ethnographical 
or security situation of the Tribal Areas. A successor to British 
India had emerged in the region, but the successor, Pakistan, 
had the same security concerns and moved quickly to 
reconstitute and reaffirm the relationship which the British 
Crown had with the Tribal areas. As such, there had not been 
any essential change. As regards the second approach, the re-
acquisition of the Tribal territories with the independence of 
Pakistan could by no means be seen as vital for the 
continuance of Afghanistan or its political or economic 
continuance. As for the third test, likewise, the failure to re-
acquire the Tribal territories with the new circumstances of 
the emergence of Pakistan cannot be seen as so injurious that 
the treaty should have been terminated. Although, touching 
on the second and third tests, Pakistan’s use of the territories 
to unsettle Afghanistan from the 1970s did injure 
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Afghanistan. However, it was not the loss of the territories in 
themselves which caused the injury, but Pakistan’s behavior 
towards Afghanistan, which could have been pursued 
regardless of whether Afghanistan possessed the territories or 
not.  
It should be noted that the change of circumstances in 
itself does not give a party a right unilaterally to withdraw 
from a treaty, but that the party should make representations 
to the other party that the obligations of the treaty should be 
changed, and that if this is turned down there should be an 
application to the court to have the terms varied. The refusal 
to submit the matter to adjudication is taken as prima facie 
evidence that the doctrine is being invoked as a cover for an 
intended breach of the law37. The failure of Afghanistan to 
make the point to Pakistan or any tribunal soon after 1947 
may invalidate it, and also count against the notion that its 
failure to regain the tribal territories were inconsistent with 
Afghanistan’s self-preservation.  
Any appeal to the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus is likely 
to be overcome by the doctrine of uti possidetis if pleaded by 
Pakistan (see below).  
 
VII. STATE PRACTICE – ESTOPPEL 
Afghanistan may attempt to argue that the conduct of 
Pakistan following 1947, in particular its frequent failure to 
adhere to the requirement of the treaties not to interfere with 
the territories on the Afghan side of the Durand Line, 
invalidates the Durand Line as an international sovereign 
boundary, or has at least prevented the frontier from 
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hardening into such a boundary from a line demarcating 
spheres of influence. Pakistan, by its conduct, has failed to 
treat the Durand Line as an international sovereign boundary, 
and hence it cannot have acquired such a status in practice. 
Such an argument would essentially be that of an estoppel 
raised by Afghanistan against Pakistan based on its state 
practice.  
The leading case from the International Court of Justice on the 
use of estoppel in territorial claims is the Temple of Preah Vihear 
Case38. It is important to note in the first instance that the 
language of the Temple case suggests that the estoppel is a 
procedural doctrine rather than a substantive doctrine. It does 
not generate any rights on the part of the claimant, but can 
only serve as a defense to a claim. Thus, if Afghanistan were 
to bring a claim it would not be able to plead the argument as 
part of its claim. However, if Pakistan were to bring a case 
seeking a declaration of the status of the Durand Line as the 
international sovereign boundary then Afghanistan would be 
able to raise the estoppel in defense against Pakistan’s claim. 
In principal, there are three elements for the assertion of an 
estoppel: first, the statement creating the estoppel must be 
clear and unambiguous; second, the statement must be 
voluntary, unconditional and authorized; third, the party 
claiming an estoppel must have relied in good faith on the 
statement of the other party, either to their own detriment or 
else the advantage of the other party. Applying these 
elements derived from the Temple case to the dispute between 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan, Afghanistan would have to show 
that the conduct of Pakistan in its transgressions of the 
Durand Line had to be directly related to the question of 
territorial possession, that it was attributable to the state of 
Pakistan, that it had to be sufficiently consistent and of a 
sufficiently long duration to be able to give rise to legitimate 
expectations on the part of Afghanistan that Pakistan no 
longer sustained its position that the Durand Line was an 
international sovereign boundary. Afghanistan would also 
have to show that to frustrate these expectations would create 
an unjustifiable detriment to itself or an unjustifiable benefit 
to Pakistan.  
Aside from Pakistan’s brief incursion across the 
Durand Line in 1949, the conduct in disregard of the line 
began in the mid-1970s following the coup against the 
monarchy in 1973. There is no doubt that following this 
period, from the presidency of Zia ul-Haq onwards, Pakistan 
has attempted to project its influence beyond the Durand Line 
into southern and eastern Afghanistan in particular. 
However, aside from the reports after 2001 of frontier posts 
being moved several miles forward on certain spots along the 
Durand Line (see above) Pakistan’s conduct has not been 
aimed at the outright possession of territory beyond the 
Durand Line, but only the projection of influence. As such, the 
assertion of estoppel appears to fail, since the conduct of 
Pakistan in this regard is not related to territorial possession, 
and Pakistan has not conceded any territory on its side of the 
Durand Line in its own conduct. It is also questionable as to 
whether there was any clear and unambiguous statement on 
the part of Pakistan that it no longer recognized the line as the 
international boundary. Its own official statements asserted 
the Durand Line as being the international boundary 
throughout the period, despite its conduct of projecting 
112 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
power beyond the line, most often by the assistance of 
militants and other proxies. Moreover, it may also be difficult 
to attribute the conduct of the militants which interfered in 
Afghanistan from behind the Pakistani side of the line to the 
Government of Pakistan. Although in some periods, notably 
in the mid-1990s with the period of Taliban rule, Pakistan 
actively assisted militants to take power in Afghanistan, in 
more recent years the militants have behaved as non-state 
actors out of the control of the Government of Pakistan, and 
have launched attacks on Afghanistan on their own volition. 
On top of this, it would be difficult for Afghanistan to show 
that it had acted on the conduct of Pakistan to its own 
detriment. With all of these arguments taken together, it 
would be difficult for Afghanistan to raise the estoppel.  
 
VIII. SELF-DETERMINATION 
It has been a complaint of the Government of 
Afghanistan that the Pashtun tribal peoples, not just those in 
FATA but also those of the North Western Frontier Province 
in 1947 were not given the option of opting for union with 
Afghanistan or of forming an independent nation of 
“Pashtunistan”.  In the Tribal hill territories, there were no 
secret ballots or attempts at international oversight. 
Afghanistan argues on this ground that it was illegitimate for 
Pakistan to retain the Tribal territories and areas inhabited by 
Pashtuns, since they were denied the full right to self-
determination.  
However, at the time of the partition there was no 
established law on how the right of self-determination should 
be exercised in practice. The first legal rules that directly dealt 
with this issue began to be crystallized in the 1950s, and in the 
form in which these rules were finally articulated – the text of 
the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 1541 (XV) (1960) – the 
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rules only applied to the administering power (‘colonial 
master’) and the basic requirement was that the administering 
power had to organize some form of a plebiscite in which the 
colonial people would be given a choice of three options: go 
independent (have their own state), merge with another 
state/people, or remain part of the colonial empire. There 
were no other substantively relevant requirements. Since this 
was not a recognized requirement under international law at 
the time of Indian independence in 1947, the limited access of 
the Pashtun peoples to self-determination cannot call into 
question the legality of Pakistan’s control over the Tribal 
areas. Moreover, as with rebus sic stantibus, the international 
law doctrine of uti possidetis stands powerfully in the way of 
any right to self-determination for peoples next to colonial 
borders during this period in history. 
 
IX. 1893 TREATY OBTAINED UNDER DURESS 
It has been a complaint of Afghanistan that the 1893 
treaty was obtained under duress. Britain, argues 
Afghanistan had recently invaded Afghanistan. It had also 
taken control of the country’s foreign relations, and was 
giving the country military assistance and financial subsidies 
on which the Amir of Afghanistan was dependent for his 
power. As such, there was a degree of duress or level of 
inequality between the parties which rendered the 1893 treaty 
invalid. 
On the question of fact, it would be difficult to show 
that there was a high degree of coercion in the negotiation of 
the 1893 treaty. The negotiations lasted a month, and a stream 
of correspondence between Sir Mortimer Durand and the 
Government of India shows that there was a genuine process 
of negotiation over this period: the British conceded to the 
Government of Afghanistan that a number of areas should fall 
114 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
on the Afghan side of the Durand Line which they had 
originally wished to fall on the Indian side. Contemporary 
accounts suggest that, even if Abdur Rahman had mixed 
feelings about the agreement, his assent was not brought 
about by duress.39  
In legal terms, even if there had been coercion as 
regarding the state of Afghanistan, international law of the 
time did not recognize a treaty as being invalid on this 
account. As Oppenheim observes, coercion in the signing of 
peace treaties “was a necessary corollary of the admissibility 
of war as an instrument for changing the existing law.”40  
On top of this, the validity of the 1893 treaty is a moot 
point in this regard, as it was finally superseded by the 1921 
treaty. This having been concluded when Afghanistan was 
independent, and when Afghanistan was pursuing treaties on 
its own account with other powers having freed itself from 
British control of its foreign relations in the 1919 Third Anglo-
Afghan War (which was initiated by Afghanistan), cannot be 
seen as a treaty obtained under duress.  
 
X. 1893 TREATY NOT PROPERLY RATIFIED BY AFGHANISTAN  
                                                 
 
 
39 Sultan Mohamed Khan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan 
146, Munshi Sultan ed., 
vol. II (1900) (“At the same time when I was occupied in breaking down 
the feudal system of Afghanistan and molding the country into a strong 
consolidated kingdom, I was not unaware nor neglectful of the necessity 
of defining my boundaries with the neighboring countries. I well knew 
that it was necessary to mark out the boundary lines between my 
dominions and those of my neighbors, for the safety and protection of my 
kingdom, and for the purpose of putting a check on their advances, and 
getting rid of misunderstandings and disputes.”). 
40 OPPENHEIM, supra note 35, at 499. 
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Some commentators have said that the 1893 treaty 
should be regarded as invalid on the grounds that it was not 
properly ratified. They argue that as the ruler of Afghanistan, 
the Amir Abdur Rahman, approved it unilaterally and did 
not offer a proper discussion or free vote on the matter in the 
legislature, the 1893 treaty should be regarded as void.  
This objection, however, is founded on an 
anachronism. On Abdur Rahman’s accession to power in 1880 
following the Second Anglo-Afghan War, he re-established 
the monarchy as being absolute. The contemporary 
constitutional theory, approved by religious scholars in 
Afghanistan, was that the power of the Amir was derived 
from God (Allah) and that he was the final arbiter in wielding 
executive, legislative and judicial power, as well as in 
determining matters of religious doctrine. He was not, as had 
previously been the case, fettered by any traditional Afghan 
tribal authorities or customs. As such, he had an absolute 
right to negotiate and conclude treaties on behalf of the state 
of Afghanistan.  
Even if it were the case that he did not have such a 
right, as Oppenheim states, if a treaty “has been entered into 
in disregard of the limitations of [a state’s] constitutional law 
and practice, that State must be deemed to have waived its 
right to assert the invalidity of the treaty if for a prolonged 
period it has failed to do so, or if it has acted upon it, or has 
obtained advantage from it.”41 Afghanistan, having 
reaffirmed the treaty under Habibullah in 1905 as well as 
Amanullah in 1919 and 1921 (see above), must be seen as 
having waived its right to assert that the treaty is void. 
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Besides this, the validity of the 1921 treaty has not been called 
into question in this fashion.  
 
XI. PAKISTAN A SUCCESSOR STATE TO BRITISH INDIA 
Afghanistan has argued that Pakistan is not a valid 
successor state to British India, and as such the treaties made 
between Afghanistan and the former British authorities are 
void.  
However, this position is not accepted by the rest of the 
international community. It was agreed between India and 
Pakistan in 1947 that British India’s treaty rights and 
obligations “having… exclusive territorial application” to 
either the new India or new Pakistan would devolve upon the 
new individual countries alone. 42  In 1949, it was stated by 
the British Government that “Pakistan is in international law 
the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government 
of India and of His Majesty’s Government of the United 
Kingdom in these territories.” In 1956, all members of the 
South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) recognized 
Pakistan as the inheritor of British India’s treaty rights and 
obligations as regards the exclusive territory of Pakistan.  
In view of the substantial body of legal scholarship on 
this point, not to mention the view of the international 
community and state practice, it is unlikely to be accepted that 
the 1921 Treaty is voided on account of Pakistan’s succession 
to British India.  
 
                                                 
 
 
42 Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India), Jurisdiction of the 
Court, Judgement, 2000 I.C.J. 12 (June 21). 
2018 THE DURAND LINE 117 
a. PAKISTAN’S CASE FOR THE VALIDITY OF THE DURAND 
LINE AND SOVEREIGNTY OVER FATA 
 
Pakistan’s case for the Durand Line being a valid 
international boundary line and possessing sovereignty over 
FATA is likely to consist in the following arguments:  
i. Effective possession of the territories by 
occupation or prescription;  
ii. The application of uti possidetis;  
iii. The state practice of Afghanistan since 1947 
(estoppel). 
iv.  
b. DISCUSSION OF PAKISTAN’S CASE 
 
i. EFFECTIVE POSSESSION  
It is a principle of international law that effective 
possession of a territory rather than any nominal entitlement 
is the main factor that counts in determining questions of 
sovereignty (ex facto ius oritur).  
The Island of Palmas case (1928)43 established the basic 
rule that “a continuous and peaceful possession” of a piece of 
territory, “manifested in the actual display of state activities” 
will generally override every other claim to the same territory 
whatever may be its basis. The current exceptions to the rule 
are the prohibition of annexations (acquisition of title by 
conquest) and the prohibition of any other acquisition carried 
out in violation of the principle of self-determination. The 
former is not applicable in this case, as the division and 
                                                 
 
 
43 Island of Palmas Case (or Miangas), (U.S v Nds.), Judgment, (1928) II RIAA 
829. 
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occupation of the territory took place by treaty rather than by 
the illegal use of force. The latter, as stated above only became 
applicable in the 1960s with the development of a doctrine of 
self-determination in international law.  
According to the Clipperton Island case (1931)44, the 
meaning of “effective possession” is that the state in question 
has to display a convincing animus occupandi, and also has to 
take steps to exercise “exclusive authority” within the 
relevant territory, which “strictly speaking, and in ordinary 
cases [can] only take… place when the state establishes in the 
territory itself an organization capable of making its laws 
respected”.  
In the Minquiers and Erechos case (1953)45, the decisive 
factors in the Court’s decision related to the administration of 
law enforcement, including the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction, the holding of inquests, and the collection of 
taxes. In this case, the administration of these functions by 
Jersey pointed to British sovereignty over the territory, 
ousting a French claim based on ownership of the territory by 
the Duchy of Normandy in the 11th century and the use of the 
territorial waters by the French fishing fleet.  
During the time of British rule, as expressed in the 
statements made by British officials (see above) the 
Government of India had no animus occupandi as regards 
FATA. However, it arguably did have a sufficient presence in 
the region to exercise an exclusive authority, the second limb 
of the requirement for sovereignty. The circumstances 
regarding FATA, particularly the customs and beliefs of 
many of the Pashtuns as to an acceptable government and 
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way of life were singular, such that what would have been 
seen as a desirable government which safeguarded the life 
and liberty of the subject in the settled areas would have been 
seen as unacceptable in FATA. With this in mind, the British 
administration exercised such organs of government in FATA 
as could practically have been established and maintained 
during the period.  
The position is complicated by the fact that FATA 
territory was divided into two classes: administered and 
unadministered. The former was garrisoned and protected by 
military forces and levies, and subject to the FCR. As 
mentioned above, the latter was left to Pashtun tribal 
jurisdiction. However, throughout the time of British rule, all 
parts of the Tribal territories, administered and 
unadministered, were subject to military incursions and 
periodic occupation. Moreover, the British authorities would 
make arrangements with the chiefs as regarding specific 
matters and requirements from time to time in the 
unadministered districts. Such a presence, suggests 
Oppenheim, is sufficient for the expression of effective control 
in distant areas.46 Thus, it could be argued that the British 
Government of India had, by the time of partition, satisfied 
the test of effective control, although not possessing animus.  
Pakistan continued the British regime in FATA, such 
that it also satisfied the test of effective control. However, 
Pakistan not only satisfied the test of effective control, but also 
the requirement for animus. Such is certainly clear from the 
statement made by the British Government at the prompting 
of Pakistan in 1950 that the Durand Line should be regarded 
as the international sovereign boundary, as well as the 1954 
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West Pakistan Act and the 1955 Constitution of Pakistan. The 
decision made by the Government of Pakistan in March 2017 
to abolish the special status of FATA and to incorporate FATA 
into the mainstream territory of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on the 
same basis as any other part of ordinary Pakistani territory 
puts the point beyond any doubt in the contemporary sphere.  
Thus, Pakistan appears to have fulfilled the 
requirements for FATA to be under its effective possession. It 
can be argued, depending on whether the tribal organization 
of the territory in the mid-20th century was sufficiently 
definite, that Pakistan has effective possession of the territory 
either by occupation, or else if the tribes had a sufficient level 
of organization to be capable such that the land should not 
have been seen as terra nullius, that Pakistan took it by right 
of prescription, where an acquiescence to the effective control 
of Pakistan over a prolonged period made good Pakistan’s 
claim to sovereignty. Possession by occupation or 
prescription would also overcome any claim based on 
nominal entitlement by Afghanistan.  
 
XII. THE APPLICATION OF UTI POSSIDETIS 
The doctrine of uti possidetis was developed in the 19th 
century to deal with the decolonization of Latin America. It 
provided that the boundaries as fixed at the time of 
decolonization should be preserved in order to prevent 
further conflict as colonizing powers departed.  
In Burkina Faso v Mali47 it was held that the principle of 
uti possidetis was of general application, “logically connected 
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with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence 
wherever it occurs.” The principle was not restricted just to 
ordinary international boundaries: “The territorial 
boundaries which have to be respected may also derive from 
international frontiers which previously divided a colony of 
one State from a colony of another, or indeed a colonial 
territory from the territory of an independent State, or one 
which was under protectorate, but had retained its 
international personality”48. Given the wide application of the 
principle, and its expressed intention of “securing respect for 
the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence 
is achieved”49 to prevent “fratricidal struggles provoked by 
the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the 
administering power”50, it is submitted that the principle is 
applicable to the Durand Line, even if at 1947 it still in legal 
terms was intended only to demarcate a sphere of influence.  
Burkina Faso v Mali also provides that uti possidetis was 
not overridden by any claims to self-determination. 
Whenever the two were in conflict, uti possidetis prevailed. 
This was also confirmed in 1992 by the EC Commission for 
Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission). In its Opinion No. 2 it 
extended the same reasoning beyond the colonial context: “it 
is well established that, whatever the circumstances, the right 
to self-determination must not involve changes to existing 
frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) 
except where the States concerned agree otherwise”.  
As such, the doctrine as the effect of preserving the 
Durand Line as constituted in 1947 and overrides any 
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objection which may be had on the grounds of self-
determination.  
 
XIII. THE STATE PRACTICE OF AFGHANISTAN (ESTOPPEL)  
The doctrine of estoppel has already been discussed 
above in regard of Afghanistan’s objections to the Durand 
Line. Likewise, it should be remembered that Pakistan could 
not use the doctrine in any positive case, but it would be a 
defense against any action that Afghanistan might bring 
against it.  
Pakistan may cogently argue that Afghanistan should be 
estopped from bringing any action against it in regard of the 
Durand Line and FATA on account of its inconsistent 
behavior and statements over a long period of time. In 1947, 
as stated above, the Afghan government declared that it had 
no claims over the tribal areas. However, in 1949 this position 
was changed to a repudiation of the clauses of the treaties 
establishing the Durand Line. Although this repudiation has 
been maintained, there has been no consistent statement of 
position from the Government of Afghanistan regarding its 
position on the status of the FATA. The calls made by the 
Afghan Government or official media have ranged from 
seeking to incorporate territory as extensive as Balochistan 
and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa into Afghanistan, to calls for these 
areas merely to have referendums for self-determination and 
the possibility of independence or incorporation into 
Afghanistan, to calls for just FATA to be incorporated into 
Afghanistan. As such, given the inconsistency of the Afghan 
position over a long period of time, such an estoppel would 
have a good chance of success.  
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XIV. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Afghanistan may put forward a number of arguments 
against the Durand Line as it is currently constituted based on 
the original intention of the frontier treaties and the 
circumstances in which they came to be made. However, 
under the terms of customary international law it appears that 
Pakistan, by means of its long-standing effective possession 
of FATA and the operation of the doctrine of uti possidetis, has 
a stronger case by far for sovereignty over FATA and for 
maintaining that the Durand Line should be seen as the 
international sovereign boundary between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.  
However, although an international law analysis of the 
problem may reach a simple and clear solution, it is not 
necessarily one which is satisfactory in the long-term 
politically, diplomatically or for international security. It is 
understandable that Afghanistan may continue to foster a 
grievance over the tribal regions, particularly given that it 
gave no active assent to a partition of sovereignty, that the 
British Government acknowledged an undefined Afghan 
“interest” in the tribes on the Indian side of the Durand Line, 
that the Afghan Government had no genuine opportunity to 
renegotiate the frontier at the time of Indian independence, 
and that the operation of uti possidetis and the lack of force in 
the doctrine of self-determination worked against 
Afghanistan at the time of Indian independence also.51 The 
current configuration of the border has proved, on account of 
geography and ethnography, difficult to govern and 
inherently unstable. It has encouraged interference both ways 
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across the frontier, not to mention encouraging Afghanistan 
to fall into the Soviet sphere in the 1960s, the first step to the 
war of the 1980s. It has given rise to the problems of drone 
strikes and “hot pursuit” in the last decade.52 
A better solution to the problem of the Durand Line 
would not consist of the parties standing on their rights under 
international law or looking to a strict division of sovereignty, 
but to a regime of co-operation across the frontier so that the 
Pashtun Hill tribes on both the Afghan and Pakistan side of 
the Durand Line could be governed coherently as a single 
entity for their own benefit. Such cross-border co-operation 
could be granted in return for an acknowledgement by 
Afghanistan of Pakistan’s formal sovereignty. The 
arrangement would benefit not only Afghanistan and 
Pakistan by removing one of the greatest stumbling blocks to 
good diplomatic relations between the two countries, but also 
the international community by allowing the establishment of 
a coherent approach to development and security.  
A settlement of the Durand Line problem might also 
assist Pakistan in coming to a settlement of the Kashmir 
conflict with India. Were Pakistan to feel less threatened on 
account of its border with Afghanistan, it might give it the 
confidence to make peace with India on its eastern frontier. It 
should be noted that such an arrangement was suggested by 
the US State department in the 1930s and again in the 1950s, 
but officials did not persist with the idea. Beyond this, a 
pooling of sovereignty or a cross-border arrangement would 
be more suited to the history and traditions of the region, 
where frontiers traditionally have been fluid and porous, and 
the Westphalian vision of frontiers and the nation state is a 
                                                 
 
 
52 Ranjan, supra 22, at 457. 
2018 THE DURAND LINE 125 
recent import which does not sit easily with the history and 
realities of the locale.    
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